Archive for Technology
- Remember to backup your data
- FastWords and Password Strength
- Tank cloaking device could utilise thermal QR codes
- Global positioning technology maturity
Remember to backup your data
After a year of blogging on my research on the EngD in Systems programme at the University of Bristol the worst happens, a word press database failure. While I do have the images and information, it will take some time uploading the information again.
FastWords and Password Strength
After seeing a great xkcd cartoon on password strengths and the how usable the password is for the user to remember and recall, I thought I’d look more into the idea of FastWords.

Generating a Password
Given the opportunity, I’ve always tried to help people generate stronger passwords from a sentence or quote they might remember and use capital letters, common substitutions and symbols for punctuation. Everybody should come up with an algorithm they are happy with and can use to generate new passwords easily. I have about five passwords at any one time, that I change regularly and I sometimes have to remember if I have forgotten to update an account somewhere.
To generate a password, I suggest that people take a phrase ‘This is one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind’, and use the first letter of each word and captialise where and when it makes sense; Tiossfmoglfm
Use common substitution to swap simple words to numbers, e.g one(once) =1, to(gether)=2, the=3, for(got) =4; Ti1ss4m1gl4m
Including symbols becomes tricky, unless you are happy with your own rule and stick to it. Only when you are confident in generating common substitution passwords (and recalling them) should you move on to including symbols. Common rules could include substituting a symbol for a space. You could use ‘_‘ or ‘|‘ for every space or work your way across the symbols on your keyboard for each space; 1! 2″ 3£ 4$ 5% 6^ 7& 8* 9( 0). This would make the final common substitution for the phrase; T!i”1£s$s%4^m&1*g(l)4!m
All I have to remember is the phrase ‘This is one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind’, substitute numbers where I can and insert symbols in sequence as I try and type it in (trying not to make a mistake). Using T!i”1£s$s%4^m&1*g(l)4!m as my password I can use GRC’s Interactive Brute Force Password “Search Space” Calculator to work out how long it would take a brute force attack to crack it;
| Search Space Depth (Alphabet): | 26+26+10+33 = 95 |
| Search Space Length (Characters): | 23 characters |
| Exact Search Space Size (Count): (count of all possible passwords with this alphabet size and up to this password’s length) |
3,106,266,216, 369,922,375,245,484,442, 102,782,269,741,626,495 |
| Search Space Size (as a power of 10): | 3.11 x 1045 |
Time Required to Exhaustively Search this Password’s Space:
| Online Attack Scenario: (Assuming one thousand guesses per second) |
9.88 hundred million trillion trillion centuries |
| Offline Fast Attack Scenario: (Assuming one hundred billion guesses per second) |
9.88 trillion trillion centuries |
| Massive Cracking Array Scenario: (Assuming one hundred trillion guesses per second) |
9.88 billion trillion centuries |
That’s strong! At first glance most will find it hard to understand that ‘correct battery horse staple‘ could be a stronger password. Against a brute force attack that has to cycle through the same space the extra five characters would clearly make it stronger due to length.
Using GRC’s Interactive Brute Force Password “Search Space” Calculator again for the xkcd password ‘correct battery horse staple‘;
| Search Space Depth (Alphabet): | 26+33 = 59 |
| Search Space Length (Characters): | 28 characters |
| Exact Search Space Size (Count): (count of all possible passwords with this alphabet size and up to this password’s length) |
39,019,378,174,832, 163,909,972,622,372,170, 131,931,859,526,600,760 |
| Search Space Size (as a power of 10): | 3.90 x 1049 |
| Online Attack Scenario: (Assuming one thousand guesses per second) |
12.41 trillion trillion trillion centuries |
| Offline Fast Attack Scenario: (Assuming one hundred billion guesses per second) |
1.24 hundred thousand trillion trillion centuries |
| Massive Cracking Array Scenario: (Assuming one hundred trillion guesses per second) |
1.24 hundred trillion trillion centuries |
Comparing the two passwords during an online attack scenario;
T!i”1£s$s%4^m&1*g(l)4!m takes 9.88 hundred million trillion trillion centuries
correct battery horse staple takes 12.41 trillion trillion trillion centuries
Imperva notes that even though hacking techniques have become better, users of today are no wiser than those 20 years ago. The company’s report says that a study of Unix password security in 1990 and hacked Hotmail passwords from 10 years ago showed little change. Read the full report from Imperva here.
Security systems now regularly ask users to generate new passwords, every 3-6 months that are at least 8-9 characters long and contain upper and lowercase letters and contain at least one number. For techies, this isn’t much trouble, but for the average user this is a demanding task. Fastwords will improve the security of user accounts and the usability of the system.
FastWords
How to hack a password
The work involved in hacking passwords is very simple. There are 5 proven ways to do so:
Asking: Amazingly the most common way to gain access to someone’s password is simply to ask for it (often in relation with something else). People often tell their passwords to colleagues, friends and family. Having a complex password policy isn’t going to change this.
Guessing: This is the second most common method to access a person’s account. It turns out that most people choose a password that is easy to remember, and the easiest ones are those that are related to you as a person. Passwords like: your last name, your wife’s name, the name of your cat, the date of birth, your favorite flower etc. are all pretty common. This problem can only be solved by choosing a password with no relation to you as a person.
Brute force attack: Very simple to do. A hacker simply attempts to sign-in using different passwords one at the time. If you password is “sun”, he will attempt to sign-in using “aaa, aab, aac, aad … sul, sum, sun (MATCH)”. The only thing that stops a brute force attack is higher complexity and longer passwords (which is why IT people want you to use just that).
Common word attacks: A simple form of brute-force attacks, where the hacker attempt to sign-in using a list of common words. Instead of trying different combination of letters, the hacker tries different words e.g. “sum, summer, summit, sump, sun (MATCH)”.
Dictionary attacks: Same concept as common word attacks – the only difference is that the hacker now uses the full dictionary of words (there are about 500,000 words in the English language)
Tank cloaking device could utilise thermal QR codes
Developed by BAE Systems, the Adaptiv technology allows vehicles to mimic the temperature of their surroundings.
Unlike traditional camouflage systems which rely on paint or nets to hide vehicles, ADAPTIV can instantly blend a vehicle into its background. The system can also be used on ships and fixed installations, allowing them to stay undetected by enemy surveillance units.
The hi-tech camouflage uses hexagonal panels or pixels made of a material that can change temperature very quickly. About 1,000 pixel panels, each of which is 14cm across, are needed to cover a small tank.
The panels are driven by on-board thermal cameras that constantly image the ambient temperature of the tank’s surroundings. This is projected on to the panels to make it harder to spot. The cameras can also work when the tank is moving. BAE Systems has also produced a library containing the heat images of other objects, such as trucks, cars and large rocks, that can be projected on to the panels.
“Earlier attempts at similar cloaking devices have hit problems because of cost, excessive power requirements or because they were insufficiently robust,” said Adaptiv project manager Pader Sjolund at BAE Systems in a statement. By contrast, he explained, Adaptiv panels add to the armour on a fighting vehicle and consume relatively little power.
“We can resize the pixels to achieve stealth for different ranges,” he added. “A warship or building, for instance, might not need close-up stealth, so could be fitted with larger panels.”
BAE estimates that the technology could be ready to put into production in two years.
Visual Identification
While the Adaptiv technology allows vehicles to mimic the temperature of their surroundings, the termal panels can also be used to identify friendly tanks to allied aircraft.
Heating a number of panels to display a simple ‘X’ on a tank, could help to reduce blue-on-blue incidents. The range of thermal symbols could be expanded to provide information on unit or mission status and convey information quickly to any allied personnel able to view and understand the iconography.
The thermal panels could also be used to transmit information visually using QR codes to allied forces to avoid RF transmission between units. While the thermal symbols could be viewed by anyone with night vision goggles, any information content would only related to short range operations within an immediate time frame when RF silence was required.
The resolution from the tank thermal panels would not be as detailed as a normal QR code, but code provide digital information on status, communication, etc. As long a line of sight is maintained, an infrared communication network could be established to avoid EM but allow beaconing.
Global positioning technology maturity
This is from a group presentation on the ‘Global Positioning System (GPS)’ given on the 11th March 2011, at the University of Bath.
The Technology Strategy and Organisation module at Bath University required a group presentation on a technology of our choice. We were asked to analyse the maturity of the technology and gage the produce performance via the S-Curve model.
Introduction
The group selected Global Positioning System (GPS) as a technology rather than as a product as the application of the technology has rapidly diverisfied across sectors and products (which was lucky as another group chose GPS, but selected a product).
S-Curve
As a technology, we decided that GPS has matured, but can still improve and has yet to reach full market saturation. This claim caused some raised eye brows, as some believed the estimated position (on a unit-less graph) should be further along the S curve.
Our reasoning was due to the flexibility of the technology that found new markets once it was released from military restrictions. GPS moved from military to civil industrial navigation applications and therefore created a new market (new S Curve). As the technology was utilised within the public domain, market forces created smaller applications of GPS for personal outdoor use. The demand for personal location technology ensured that GPS was included in the next generation of smart phones.
We are currently seeing the application of personal GPS to things we care about such as our children, pets and high value objects. While this could help you find your keys and where you parked your car, other applications are obviously spying on cheating partners and stalking.
An extension of all S curves will be the identification and location of any and all items owned by military, industry and personally. During the talk we also wanted to raise awareness to the successful creation of ‘Big Brother’.
The application of a technology or product to only one S curve is misleading as there are a number of Key Performance Indicator (KPI) to consider such as accuracy, reliability and cost. Supporting and alternative technologies should also be analysed as other KPI factors might be size, battery life, ease of use. Switching to an alternative base technology might give a product an edge.
Trying to apply our vision of the GPS technolgy to a Product-Process Cycle would be meaningless so the application of GPS within mobile phones was used to demonstrate the analysis technique. GPS has been used within mobile phones for personal location, but it is a mature technology for this capability. While GPS accuracy is still limited by the USA Military, and dispite the European Union launching it’s own Galileo global navigation satellite system (GNSS)[1], the use of General packet radio service (GPRS) signal strength between know base station reciever towers is on the rise as a highly accurate, fast and reliable alternative.
Dominant Design
Using the Dominant Design Model, we were able to demonstrate the dominant applications and products throughout history to highlight that the need for a Global Positioning System (GPS) has existed for thousands of years and will continue into the challenges of inter-global positioning (space travel).
Diffusion Curve
Trying to apply the Diffusion Curve model caused some great discussions within the group, resulting in the example that the technology is still with the early majority within Europe and is maturing as GPS technology becomes a standard technology component in numerous items. An example position for china/India was given to highlight how other markets might have rapidly adopted the technology within its own products, with high consumer impact, leading to a quick progression from innovators, through early adopters to an (early) Early Majority position.
Discussion
Implications of these analysis models for technology strategy for these organisations and potential entrants include;
- They work well for a physical product evolution, but have some difficulty when applying contextually to complex systems.
- Our system was too big to handle within the set time scale of an afternoon; we set our scope boundaries too wide to successfully manage. Boundaries would need to be rationalized (reduced, simplified) for a proper analysis.
- Market evolution not product specific, looking at the technology meant that we had to track across multiple S curve models. The other group, would have had more
- More questions were generated than answers, systems scope understanding expanded.
- In application of the dominant design model highlighted how complex the system is.
References
[1] One of the political aims with Galileo is to provide a high-accuracy positioning system upon which European nations can rely independent from the Russian GLONASS and US GPS systems, which can be disabled for commercial users in times of war or conflict.
“Why Europe needs Galileo”. ESA. 2010-04-12. http://www.esa.int/esaNA/GGG0H750NDC_galileo_0.html. Retrieved 2011-03-10.
http://www.esa.int/esaNA/GGG0H750NDC_galileo_0.html



