Archive for Research
- Defence Industrial Strategy (December 2005)
- Cyber Security strategy of the United Kingdom (June 2009)
- Recognition-Primed Decision model for Rapid Decision Making
- Very high stress sensitivity of magneto-impedance (MI) in CoMnSiB amorphous wires at GHz frequencies
Defence Industrial Strategy (December 2005)
This is just some quick e-cuttings from the DIS that might be interesting to some people that can’t be bothered to read the DIS themselves.
A3.28 Market Implications
In the past the relationship between the Ministry Of Defence (MOD) and industry was transactional with the majority of the budget focused in the Equipment Programme. Current involvement with industry spans across a range of products and services over the boundary of peacetime and deployed environments. Previously supplied items are being grouped into larger packages (inc through-life, system-of-systems and cross-platform), with industry accessing a substantial portion of the Short Term Plan (STP) in addition to the Equipment Programme. Future trends will see the MOD more explicitly dependant on key suppliers for delivery of defence outcomes as larger portions of the budget will be available to industry.
A3.29 Increasing importance of Information Communication Technologies (ICT)
The differentiator in military operations has changed from scale and potency, to agility and flexibility to meet operational environments. Defence demands on the industrial sector are becoming more sophisticated The civil sector has driven innovation at high clock speeds, along open international standards. To remain at the leading edge of military capability requires increasing the exploitation of commercially driven ICT. This will require the alignment of business models through novel approaches; Government making the market attractive, commitment to Commerical Off The Shelf (COTS), Common Standard and open architectures. MOD recognises the importance of accessing commercially-led technology developments through the broadest supply base.
B1. Systems Engineering
The UK industry needs to have systems engineering capability to integrate system of systems and adapt systems to take advantage of new technology and respond to threats. It is vital that systems engineering and long-term knowledge is maintained, otherwise it is little use investing in cutting-edge research, without the knowledge to exploit and integrate into existing systems.
Systems engineering delivers an overall result that is greater than the sum of its parts.
Systems engineering executes an interdisciplinary process to ensure that the customer and stakeholders’ needs are satisfied through out a systems life cycle.
Systems engineering is as relevant to the design of a computer chip as it is to the development of military strategy for a particular conflict. The future trend is clearly towards greater systems complexity across all sectors.
The growing importance of networks and their interactions with partial systems will make a platform-centric perspective less useful in future when considering how to meet operational capability requirements.
B8. Command, Control, Communication and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR)
C4ISTAR is an area where sustained expenditure is expected to underpin the Network Enabled Capability essential to the continued transformation of defence, by providing the technology required to deliver agile, networked and informed Armed Forces.
This technology is driven by the civil sector where the MOD is a minor customer.
Specific industrial capabilities should be maintained within the UK industrial sector;
- PROTECT – High grade cryptography and information assurance
- MAINTAIN – Ability to understand and integrate mission critical systems
- INTEGRATE – Track emerging technologies for potential military application.
- RECRUIT – Sustained research and development base with people having the right skills, supported by a manufacturing capability in specific areas of defence technology.
C4ISTAR is a growing market driven by advances in the domestic software, electronic and entertainment areas.
The world defence market is dominated by US companies that are attracted to the UK due to an open defence market. This could create an imbalance as US technologies are favoured but restricted due to technology export, ITAR restrictionss.
Maintaining a cryptographic capability requires a specific strategy. Working with other departments, greater coherence across government should increase industry’s visibility of the total opportunities. Further work in 2006 will inform our research and technology priorities.
The 2004 White paper ‘Delivering Security in a changing world: Future Capabilities’ stated that the exploitation of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is vital for the continued transformation of UK Armed Forces.
The ability to respond more quickly and precisely will act as a force multiplier enabling our forces to achieve the desired effect through a smaller number of capable assets. NEC is one of our highest priorities for future investment in research. NEC goal is characterised by synchronisation, though the delivery strategy must continue to evolve as opportunities from technology innovation are exploited.
C4ISTAR capabilities will underpin NEC by providing the technology to enable agile, networked and informed armed forces. Three principle areas provide capability;
- Command and Battlespace Management provide commanders with the information they require such as Bowman, Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP), Joint Command and Control Support Programme (J2CSP), ARRC Command and Control Information System (ARRC C2IS) and Future Integrated Soldier Technology (FIST).
- Network programmes will facilitate the rapid and secure communication of data. Example programmes are Bowman, Skynet 5, Cormorant,
- ISTAR projects are needed to acquire and analyse data for the Armed Forces. Projects include Soothsayer, Shaman, watchkeeper, UK Intelweb
B11 Defence Technology Priorities to enable defence capability
- Secure and robust communication technologies that will provide superior information and intelligence through cryptography and information infrastructure.
- Data and information by expertise in image analysis, target identification and tracking algorithms, data fusion, network design and stability.
- Technologies for remote and autonomous operation will provide protection for armed forces personnel; the most valuable military asset by the deployment of autonomous systems where ever possible.
- Automated Information and Knowledge technologies under pin all automated decisions and require exploitation of;
- Information and Data management
- Data mining and information extraction
- Self adapting networks
- Data storage
- Advanced Digital Signal Processing
- High bandwidth secure data-links
- High bandwidth encryption
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Filed under Cyber Security strategy of the United Kingdom (June 2009)
Overview
This report states the aims of the UK government towards the future use of cyberspace as a nation. Not to expose current potential vulnerabilities of the UK Government, this document avoids any technical details and provides an overview of larger strategic objectives and future goals. The new Office of Cyber Security (OCS) will drive change within government, develop understanding of the cyber situation and facilitate information exchange between existing organisations.
Reduce the risk from the use of cyberspace
- Reduce the threat of malicious cyber operations by reducing adversary’s motivation and capability
- Reduce the vulnerability of UK cyber operations
- Reduce impact of cyber operations on UK interests
Exploiting cyberspace opportunities
- Gather intelligence on adversaries
- Intervene against cyber operations
Improve knowledge, capability and decision-making
- Improve knowledge and awareness
- Develop doctrine and policy
- Develop governance and decision making
- Enhance technical and human capabilities
The UK government understands that cyber space encompasses all forms of networked digital activity. The foundations of cyberspace are the individual computer and communication technology we use everyday. Computer-facilitated communication has accelerated over the last twenty years, changing how the economic, social and political interests of a nation operate.
Public
Consumers now use electronic communication to purchase goods; 90% of high street payments are made via plastic cards, online sales were worth 50bn in 2009.
Between 2007 and 2008, there was an 8% increase in the number of households with internet access, around 16.5 million or 65% of UK homes.
Business
Cyberspace and globalisation have allowed businesses to co-ordinate complex supply chains and maintain operations. Businesses are currently consolidation critical parts of their organisation abroad and relying on networks to communicate with UK.
Government
The UK government wants to enable the full benefits of cyberspace for the UK.
Government is reliant on cyberspace due to the Transformational Government Strategy (2005) that aims to provide services to the public that utilise the internet. A growing dependence on the internet, leads to greater exposure. Cyberspace now supports much of the national infrastructure, our utilities, food, distribution, transportation, health service and financial system are reliant upon the internet. Government has taken action to secure cyberspace through the National Information Assurance Strategy (2005,2007) that outlines the first steps for the UK in assuring the integrity, availability and confidentiality of Information Communication Technology (ICT) systems.
Strategy
No one institution can address the security challenges in isolation, a partnered approach by government, organisations and the public is required to achieve collective goals. Lessons can be learnt from how other nations have tackled issues individually and through the international sphere.
The continued openness of the internet is fundamental to the free flow of ideas, promotion of democratic ideals and the delivery of economic benefits.
The UK cyber security strategy is consistent with the principles of the National Security Strategy; Human Rights, Rule of Law, Accountable Government, Justice, Freedom, Tolerance and Opportunity for all.
- Realistic about risk and capabilities to meet security challenges.
- Retain strong, balanced and flexible capabilities.
- Continue to invest in, learn and improve our security.
- Tackle vulnerabilities early, using
- Oversea – a multilateral approach
- Home – a partner approach
- Within government – an integrated approach
The distributed and decentralised nature of the internet means that a wide range of tools are required to secure and defend against malicious cyber operations. An ethical foundation and by working closely with the wider public, industry and civil liberties groups guidelines on the use of such tools is essential to ensure these tools are not abused.
Current Organisations
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) provides advice to reduce the vulnerability of national intrastructure and provides a trusted environment where confidential information can be shared for mutual benefit.
Communications Electronics Security Group (CESG) based at GCHQ provides
- National Technical Authority for Information Assurance
- Computer Emergancy Response Team (GovCertUK) provides warnings, alerts and assistance in resolving IT issues.
Home Office, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and Police work to combat malicious cyber activity through the application on strategy such as the forthcoming APCO e-crime strategy.
Proposed Organisations
Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) a multiagency unit, the centre will monitor developments in cyber space, analyse trends (situational awareness) and improve technical response co-ordination. Membership will be drawn from key stakeholder organisations and will sit along side the CESG within the Information Assurance arm of GCHQ.
The Office of Cyber Security (OCS) based in the Cabinet Office, will provide strategic leadership across government and drive the delivery and implementation of policy. The OCS will build upon existing work to deliver a programme of eight work streams;
- Safe, Secure and Resilient systems will work to enhance preparation for and protection from cyber attacks through improved understanding of vulnerabilities, their exploitation and mitigation measures. A study of resilience and redundancy within the telecoms sector may provide transferable lessons and improve standards.
- Policy, Doctrine, Legal and Regulatory issues will identify gaps in domestic and international frameworks and take the lead in addressing issues.
- Awareness and culture change will implement social engineering at all levels of government to instil behaviour and a working culture that reflects a cyber security conscious workforce.
- Skills and Education will ensure the growth of required skills and expertise needed by government and industry.
- Technical Capabilities & Research and Development will provide input into the work led by the second work stream that will develop and implement an industrial strategy for cyber security. Using information from the CSOC, analysis will focus research and development efforts. Government will facilitate an international approach through partnerships. Funding will first expand collaborative work on securing UK Networks. The OCS, Network Security Innovation Platform (NSIP) and the Technology Strategy Board will provide opportunities for world class high-tech companies.
- Exploitation will develop understanding of the capabilities required to combat threats from adversary categories; criminals, terrorists, state actors. Work will identify gaps and develop strategies to address them.
- International Engagement will allow OCS to develop greater coherence with overseas partners and international organisations.
- Governance, Roles and Responsibilities will keep the governance on cyber issues under review, learn lessons and share best practice with partners.
Recognition-Primed Decision model for Rapid Decision Making
Klein, G.A., 1993. A recognition-primed decision (RPD) model of rapid decision making. In G. A. Klein et al., eds. Decision making in action Models and methods. Ablex, pp. 138-147.
Available at: http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Klein_1989_AMMSR_RPDM.pdf
Abstract
Traditional models of decision making do not take into account many critical aspects of operational settings, as described in Chapter 1. Decision makers in operational settings are usually very experienced, in contrast to the naive subjects used in laboratory studies. In this chapter I present a recognitional model of decision making that shows how people can use experience to avoid some of the limitations of analytical strategies. This model explains how people can make decisions without having to compare options. It fuses two processes-situation assess· ment and mental simulation-and asserts that people Wle situation assessment to generate a plausible course of action and use mental simulation to evaluate that course of action. I believe this recognition. al model describes how decision making is usually carried out in realworld settings. This conclusion is based on a series ofstudies in which it was found that recognitional decision malting is much more common than analytical decision making. Finally, I contrast the strengths and weaknesses of recognitional and analytical decision strategies.
Methodology
This paper uses case studies that cover decisions made over several days as well as those made in less than 1 minute; decisions involving primarily a single individual and also teams of 5-9 people; decision makers with more than 20 years of command experience and newly promoted officers. Both qualitative and quantitative methods of investigation were employed in these studies, including semistructured interviews, on-site observations, and protocol analysis. The tasks performed ranged in the level of realism from the observations and interviews during an actual wildland fire requiring coordination of 4,000 crew members, to military exercises and computer simulations, to classroom planning exercises.
Key Points
• Prescriptive decision strategies are not designed for ill-defined tasks or for time-pressured situations.
• A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model describes how decision makers use their experience to avoid deliberations.
• Experience enables a person to understand a situation in terms of plausible goals, relevant cues, expectancies, and typical actions.
• Experienced decision makers usually try to find a satisfactory course of action, not the best one.
• Experienced decision makers can usually identify an acceptable course of action as the first one they consider, and rarely have to generate another course of action.
• Decision makers can evaluate a single course of action through mental simulation and don’t have to compare several options.
• Recognitional decision strategies are more appropriate under time pressure and ambiguity
• Analytical strategies are more appropriate with abstract data and pressure to justifydecisions.
• In a variety of operational settings, recognitional decision strat- egies are used more frequently than analytical strategies, even for difficult cases.
Reflection
Recognition-primed decision (RPD) is a model of how people make quick, effective decisions when faced with complex situations. In this model, the decision maker is assumed to generate a possible course of action, compare it to the constraints imposed by the situation, and select the first course of action that is not rejected. RPD has been described in diverse groups including ICU nurses, fireground commanders, chess players, and stock market traders. It functions well in conditions of time pressure, and in which information is partial and goals poorly defined. The limitations of RPD include the need for extensive experience among decision-makers (in order to correctly recognise the salient features of a problem and model solutions) and the problem of the failure of recognition and modeling in unusual or misidentified circumstances. It appears to be a valid model for how human decision-makers make decisions.
The RPD model identifies a reasonable reaction as the first one that is immediately considered. RPD combines two ways of developing a decision; the first is recognising which course of action makes sense, and the second, evaluating the cause of action through imagination to see if the actions resulting from that decision make sense. However, the difference of being experienced or inexperienced plays a major factor in the decision-making processes.
RPD reveals a critical difference between experts and novices when presented with recurring situations. Experienced people will generally be able to come up with quicker decision because the situation may match a prototypical situation they have encountered before. Novices, lacking this experience, must cycle through different possibilities, and tend to use the first course of action that they believe will work. The inexperienced also have the tendencies of using trial and error through their imagination.
Traditional models of decision making do not take into account many critical aspects of operational settings. Decision makers in operational settings are usually very experienced, in contrast to the naive subjects used in laboratory studies. Gary Klein presents a recognitional model of decision making that shows how people can use experience to avoid some of the limitations of analytical strategies.
This model explains how people can make decisions without having to compare options. It fuses two processes-situation assessment and mental simulation-and asserts that people use situation assessment to generate a plausible course of action and use mental simulation to evaluate that course of action. I believe this recognitional model describes how decision making is usually carried out in real-world settings. This conclusion is based on a series of studies in which it was found that recognitional decision malting is much more common than analytical decision making. Finally, I contrast the strengths and weaknesses of recognitional and analytical decision strategies.
“The fireground commanders’ accounts of their decision making do not fit into a decision-tree framework. The fireground commanders argued that they were not “making choices,” “considering alterna· tives,” or “assessing probabilities.” They saw themselves as acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience; they were generating, monitoring, and modifying plans to meet the needs of the situations. “
“Once the fireground commanders knew it was “that” type of case, they usu-ally also knew the typical way of reacting to it. They would use avail- able time to evaluate an option’s feasibility before implementing it. They would imagine how the option was going to be implemented, to discover if anything important might go wrong. If problems were fore- seen, then the option might be modified or rejected altogether, and another highly typical reaction explored.”
The model fuses two processes, situation assessment and mental simulation.
- Situation assessment – generates a course of action
- Mental simulation – evaluates the course of action
Recognitional decision making is more common than analytical decision making.
Four types of SITUATION ASSESSMENT
a) Understand types of goals that can be accomplished
b) Increase salient clues that are important within the context
c) Forming expectations which can serve as a check
d) Identify typical actions to take
There are a number of features that distinguish the RPD model from classical decision models.
- The RPD model focuses on situation assessment rather than judging one option to be superior to others.
- The RPD model describes how people bring their experience to bare on a decision.
- The RPD asserts that experienced decision makers can identify a reasonably good option as the first one they consider, rather than treating option generation as a semi-random process, requiring the decision maker to generate many options.
- The RPD model relies on satisficing (Simon, 1955) rather than optimising-finding the first option that works, not necessarily the best option.
- The RPD model focuses on serial evaluation of options and thereby avoids the requirement for concurrent deliberation between options that marks the focus on the “moment of choice.”
- The RPD model asserts that experienced decision makers evaluate an option by conducting mental simulations of a course of action to see if it will work, rather than having to contrast strengths and weaknesses of different options.
- A recognitional strategy enables the decision maker to be continually prepared to initiate action by committing to the option being evaluated. Formal strategies require the decision maker to wait until the analyses are completed before finding out which option was rated the highest.
Thoughts
The research shows that recognitional decision making is more likely when the decision maker is experienced, when time presaure is greater, and when conditions are less stable. In contrast, analytical decision making seems to prevail when the available data are abstract and alphanumeric rather than perceptual, when the problems are very combinatorial, when there is a dispute between different constituencies, and when there is a strong requirement to justify the course of action chosen.
This does not propose that there is a best decision strategy. Both recognitional and analytical approaches have their functions. Sometimes, both are applied within the same decision task. The main claim is that recognitional strategies can be adaptive, can allow experienced decision makers to respond effectively. Limitations of analytical decision strategies occur when used in the wrong conditions, they can leave the decision maker unable to react quickly and effectively. Conversely, the danger of misapplying recognitional decision strategies is that personnel will lack the experience needed to identify effective courses of action as the first ones considered, or will lack the ability to mentally simulate the option to find the pitfalls. or will fail to optimise when necessary.
Very high stress sensitivity of magneto-impedance (MI) in CoMnSiB amorphous wires at GHz frequencies
Here is an EMSA conference paper on some work from my BEng final year project.
S. I. Sandaccia[1], R. Craig, D. P. Makhnovskiya[1], and L. V. Paninaa[1]
[1]School of Computing, Communications and Electronics, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA, United Kingdom.
Co-rich amorphous magnetic wires exhibit very large change in high frequency impedance, when subjected to a dc axial magnetic field ex H .[1] This magneto-impedance (MI) effect is originated from the skin effect in conjunction with the transverse magnetisation processes, which can be very sensitive to ex H for certain magnetic configurations. Applying a stress or a torque also can cause the change in the wire transverse magnetisation and very large variations in impedance [2]. This paper investigates the effect of applied tensile stress on MI in glass-coated Co68.5Mn6.5Si10B15 amorphous wires at frequencies 0.5−3 GHz and discusses the application of this effect for wireless stress/pressure sensors and stress-tuneable microwave devices.
The complex-valued impedance is found by measuring S11-parameter (reflection) by means of the Hewlett-Packard 8753E Vector Network Analyser (VNA) with a specially designed microstripe cell to minimise the post calibration mismatches. The wire is loaded with a weight in its centre. The cell is placed into the Helmholtz coil producing a dc magnetic field. Figure 1 shows the plots of impedance vs. applied stress for two frequencies 500 MHz and 2.5 GHz with ex H as a parameter. A large stress effect on MI appears only in the presence of the field and is in the range of 100% and 60% per 180 MPa at 500 GHz and 2.5 GHz, respectively, for ex H =3 Oe. These experimental results are in very good agreement with theory. Co-based amorphous wires have a circumferential anisotropy originated by coupling between negative magnetostriction and dominant tensile axial stress. Then, the applied tensile stress alone will not cause the change in the direction of the equilibrium magnetisation, and as a result, will not produce noticeable changes in the impedance at high frequencies. Applying the field ex H of the order of the anisotropy field saturates the wire in the axial direction. The tensile stress which enlarges the circumferential anisotropy in the case of negative magnetostriction acts in opposite way and rotates the magnetisation back to the circular direction. This process is accompanied by large changes in the high frequency wire impedance, which has been experimentally proven in our previous works on microwave MI.
Tensile stress at GHz frequencies
References:
[1] D. P. Makhnovskiy, L. V. Panina, and D. J. Mapps, Phys. Rev. B 63, 144424 (2001).
[2] L.P. Shen, T. Uchiyama, K Mohri, and K. Bushida, IEEE Trans. Magn. 33, 3355 (1997).
[3] S. Sandacci, D. P. Makhnovskiy, L. V. Panina, J. Magn. Magn. Mater., accepted (2004).